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Précis

The mergers between AT&T and Cingular, Sprint and Nextel, and Verizon and
Alltel telecommunication companies have become the most fascinating transactions in
the wireless industry. This paper provides a detailed summary of the two companies in
each merger as separate entities before the merger, the actions they took while
completing the merger, and the new look and strategies they put into place after the
merger. This paper provides a thorough view of how AT&T, Sprint Nextel, and Verizon
successfully completed their merger plans and how they gained nationwide consumer
satisfaction. The reader will examine the problems within the companies such as the case
with the Sprint/Nextel merger. The paper briefly shows the intense competition between
Verizon Wireless and Cingular/AT&T. The overall question to this thesis is: Which of
these companies completed the ideal merger? The thesis analyzes the mergers in
chronological order of the merger deals starting from the AT&T Inc. to Verizon Wireless.
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Introduction

Wireless firms around the world have been driven or compelled to merge or seek
partnership for a number of reasons. Firms tend to gain market share through mobile
products and accessories. Another reason for the mergers is the technology of the
products. Since computers and internet are in high demand, the wireless companies
include access to fast-speed internet through their phones. In some instances, mergers
occur because cost reduction of these products. The smartphones create price competition
between these wireless companies. When the companies sell them in the market, they sell
the smartphones at a high price to show high quality products. As the phone sales
progress, companies price the smartphones at cheaper prices to attract price sensitive
consumers. Firms tend to merge because of the inability to gain a strong customer
database. The firms believe customer satisfaction is essential to industry. The comfort of
communication from the customers enables the wireless companies to become strong.
The widespread demand of technology and successful implementation of wireless
services are drivers of merging because they are mutual goals between the merging
companies.
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1. AT&T

1.1 Wireless Companies Preceding the Merger
The New AT&T Inc. has a very broad history in the wireless industry preceding
the merger transaction. AT&T Wireless Services was popular during the 1990s capturing
urban and rural markets. In the early 2000s, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
became SBC Communications and acquired by BellSouth formed the new wireless
service Cingular Wireless LLC. Other regional telephone companies within the Bell
System, Pacific Bell Telephone Company and Ameritech Mobile Communications, had
interests in Cingular Wireless LLC. Both the popular wireless service companies AT&T
Wireless Services Inc. and Cingular Wireless LLC were in close competition with
Verizon Wireless, itself a joint venture of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX Mobile
Communications. There were ties between both wireless service companies.

A. History of AT&T Wireless Services
AT&T Wireless Services is the service that had a longer history and recognition
out of the companies within the merger. AT&T Wireless Services Inc. was not the initial
name of the wireless company. The initial name of the company was McCaw Cellular,
Inc. founded by an entrepreneur named Craig McCaw. In January 1994, AT&T sought to
purchase the wireless company after its split from the Bell System. AT&T’s request to
acquire McCaw Cellular Inc. created an intervention of the BellSouth Company. In trying
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to seek a court review, BellSouth believed that this wireless transaction prevents the
company from achieving its future goals of providing long distance services to their
customers (Naik, 1994). The court favored AT&T’s action because the McCaw Cellular,
Inc. was not entitled to property rights by any company within the Bell System, which
includes BellSouth.
As a result of the court ruling, AT&T purchased McCaw Corporations, Inc. and
officially changed the newly acquired service as AT&T Wireless Services Inc. The
McCaw corporate executives became doubtful of the situation. However, they also saw
this AT&T brand as a powerful company who people can rely on for cellular and long
distance services. Over the next few years, these corporate executives’ dreams became
genuine. In the late 1990s, AT&T Wireless Services Inc. was the leading nationwide
wireless service provider that emphasized the no roaming or long distance fees (Richman,
2004). It is incredible to examine how much work the parent AT&T Company put in to
create such a successful division. In the 1990s, AT&T established its fame for its
home/office phone services and the publicly used cellular phone services.

B. History of Cingular Wireless LLC
SBC Communications, the company current AT&T began in 1983, was
expanding during the late 1990s from a Southwestern regional telephone company to a
global telecommunications company. BellSouth desired to follow its former bell partner,
and focus on wireless and broadband services. In January 2001, BellSouth got its wish of
getting hold of and maintaining a wireless phone service. BellSouth and SBC
Communications created a joint venture named Cingular Wireless LLC. The company
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also had a partnership with AT&T Wireless Services Inc. Cingular Wireless became a
success in the United States trailing Verizon Wireless as the number two wireless service
provider. Verizon was a popular service provider in urban areas. A year later, Cingular
Wireless persisted on executing a $4 billion deal to convert its network to GSM. The
company used this network after it demonstrated a major success in the European and
Asian markets (Microwaves & RF, 2002). Cingular made a wise decision to convert their
wireless network system and capabilities. They enable the users to utilize their phones in
almost any part of the world.
In May 2003, Cingular continued to make more plans in trying to battle Verizon
Wireless for the number one wireless network in the United States. Verizon Wireless
outmatched Cingular Wireless 33.3 million customers to 22.1 million customers (Drucker
and Frank, 2003). Cingular failed to capture profit from cities with major markets such as
Boston, New York, Washington, and Los Angeles. Cingular sought to operate their
networks effectively and efficiently by buying licenses from the bankrupt NextWave
Telecom Inc. During the same period, Cingular attempted to acquire either the newly
created T-Mobile USA or the long known AT&T Wireless Services. These companies
closely followed Cingular in the wireless service industry. They wanted to acquire TMobile USA because they did not want to rely on the network share in New York City.
However, Cingular wanted to merge AT&T Wireless Services because they feared their
competition.
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1.2 The 2004 Merger

A. Cingular’s Successful Bid for AT&T
The year 2004 was the year in which Cingular wanted to put these acquisition
plans into action. In February 2004, Cingular Wireless was unsuccessful in its attempt to
acquire T-Mobile USA. T-Mobile USA’s parent, Deutsche Telekom, declined Cingular
Wireless’s offer (Van, 2004). During the same month, AT&T Wireless Services decided
to auction its services to Cingular Wireless and Britain’s Vodaphone Wireless Group.
Cingular won the bid for $41 billion and gave SBC Communications $25 billion from the
bid (Mohl, 2004). Most industry analysts and consumers throughout the United States
believed that with this acquisition Cingular would have an advantage over Verizon
Wireless because of the additional customers from the former AT&T Wireless Services.
This new Cingular/AT&T merger had to find ways to appeal to the public. They
had to select the best employees in their staff to handle management and operations. The
merger also needed to renovate the retail outlets of both Cingular Wireless and AT&T
Wireless Services so that they have a universal structure. In order for it to outmatch
Verizon Wireless as the number one leading service provider in the nation, the
Cingular/AT&T merger needed to satisfy all customers of the two former entities.
Many people believed that Verizon Wireless retains the number one rank of
wireless service provider. Other sources say that the Cingular/AT&T merger gains a huge
number of customers making it more difficult for Verizon Wireless to stay in the first
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rank. A survey from wireless customers shows that the merger would have 46 million
customers compared to Verizon’s 37.5 million customers (Luke, 2004). The
Cingular/AT&T merger had the title for the number one wireless provider. The merger
gained customers from both companies and allowed the merged company a better
business.

B. Company Management
The combination of the two companies brought many changes to management
within the new Cingular/AT&T. The merger shut down several retail stores and kiosks.
However, it gave employees of the two companies more job responsibilities to serve this
increasing number of wireless customers. Cingular representative Clay Owen stated that
the merger planned to hire 4,000 employees to assist with the increase of customer calls
(Luke, 2004). The merged Cingular/AT&T wanted to remain fair and loyal to the
customers and employees within the organization and advanced the goal of generating a
combined effort from all the employees to meet the customers’ demands as well as to
create an excellent icon for the company.

1.3 Cingular/AT&T: During and After the Merger

A. Surpassing Verizon for the U.S. Mobile Crown
The Cingular/AT&T merger achieved its goal in December 2004 when it
surpassed wireless giant Verizon Wireless in customer enrollment. The merger had 46
million customers within the fourth quarter (Cuneo, 2004). The newly merged company
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decided to take some steps to change its marketing and advertising to its customers. It
retained the orange splash symbol. The only change within the merged company’s
advertising symbol was that the word Cingular was in AT&T’s traditional blue font. The
slogan of “raising the bar” replaces the slogan “what fits you best” showing that the
merger was increasing its wireless services to the public. By Christmas of 2004, the
combined cell sites of Cingular and AT&T ranged from 48,000 to 49,000 cell sites
(Keefe, 2004). This increase in cell sites shows us the success of the merger. It also
demonstrates how difficult it was for other wireless companies such as Verizon Wireless,
Nextel, Sprint, and T-Mobile to compete in the wireless market.

B. Christmas 2004: A Blessing for the Company
Heading into January 2005, the merged company appeared satisfied with its
fourth quarter results. Its revenue rose by 86 percent and in addition the operating
expenses jumped to 96 percent to 7 billion dollars. The revenue of the combined
company was 8.1 billion dollars compared to the 7.9 billion dollars from the year before
(Drucker, 2005). The 2004 Christmas holiday sales contributed to the merger’s increase.
These statistics gives us a positive look of the merger. It helped both companies to
recover from the woes from the previous year in terms of customer satisfaction and
wireless services.
The Cingular /AT&T merger extended their plan of recovering from the past woes
going into the year 2005. The merger continued to make more innovations within the
service. In March 2005, the Cingular/AT&T merger decided to make an upgrade for
high-speed connection, 3G wireless services, which enable the wireless customers to
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access all internet applications (Yuan and Drucker, 2005). This was a breakthrough in the
service because the users have the ability to navigate and search the internet while
traveling and without consuming much power as opposed to using the internet on a
regular computer desktop. Wi-Fi connection was Cingular/AT&T’s vital concern to
overcome the Verizon Wireless’s strong Wi-Fi services. Jeff Bradley, Vice President of
data solutions of the Cingular/AT&T merger, was very optimistic about the move to the
3G wireless network. In an April 2005 interview, Bradley stated that it was convenient to
put such a heavy load of data onto a wireless network that is usable for long commutes
and travel (Buckley, 2005). The merger was very successful in bringing satisfaction to
the customers. It gave consumers the advantage of using the internet on a device that is
reliable and more mobile. This internet application gave consumers more reasons to buy
and use cellular phones practice.
As Cingular/AT&T continued to make more changes to its carrier applications, it
also made more changes within the company during the year 2006. About two years after
buying Cingular, AT&T acquired BellSouth for an estimated 67 billion dollars (Granelli,
2006). This acquisition was a rare transaction in which one former member of the long
established Bell System acquired another former member. AT&T, originally founded as
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SBC Communications), acquired BellSouth
who infact established the grounds of Cingular LLC. Using the transition law, AT&T
used this acquisition strategy to gain more control and fully utilize Cingular to its full
potential under the merger. As a result, both the BellSouth and Cingular names folded
into one name, simply AT&T, which would take place within the next year.
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C. New Identity “Equals” New Icon
The year 2007 proved to be an important year for the Cingular/AT&T merger. In
January 2007, Cingular’s new name officially became AT&T Inc. During the beginning
of the first quarter of 2007, they put their plan into action. In December 2004 during the
early days of the merger, company executives combined the Cingular orange splash icon
and the AT&T icon so that customers view Cingular becoming AT&T. However, this
was a short-term symbol as envisioned by the merger. The executives took a different
approach by displacing all of the Cingular icons. The management’s only priority was to
establish a name for the new corporation.

D. The Beginning of “The New AT&T Inc.”
Taking all insignias of Cingular, the company retained all of AT&T’s attributes,
such as the traditional blue color, because of its popularity during the decades. According
to an estimate, advertising costs accounted for about 20 percent of the operating expenses
of the new company (Searcey, 2007). Wireless customers recognized the company as
AT&T prior to the merger. The merger not only displayed the AT&T that began in the
1980s. It is the new AT&T Inc. demonstrating all the capabilities that were initially
established by both Cingular Wireless LLC and AT&T Wireless Services Inc under this
popular name in the telephone industry.

E. AT&T Partners with Apple: A Fruitful Alliance
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Now that AT&T established an icon, it had other tasks on its agenda. AT&T was
planning to continue its deal with Apple Inc. when a year ago AT&T reached an
agreement with Apple in the development of wireless services. Originally, Apple planned
to brand its own phone for Cingular. Cingular declined the offer and instead decided to
produce a mobile phone by Apple to its customers of AT&T. Both AT&T and Apple
agreed on the creation of the “New Apple iPhone.” Apple chief executive, Steve Jobs,
announced of this iPhone’s touch screen usage (Richtel, 2007). This phone is competing
against the likes of Verizon’s Chocolate Phone and T-Mobile’s Sidekick Phone. AT&T’s
strategy in this case was to cooperate with a major company in the computer industry to
introduce this touch screen technology.
In July 2007, the Apple iPhone became a success. A research conducted in San
Francisco showed that consumers bought approximately 525,000 iPhones (Friedman and
White, 2007) in the second quarter. This became a huge boost in sales at AT&T retail
stores. In September 2007, both AT&T and Apple settled for a new approach. The
iPhone’s price decreased from 599 dollars to 399 dollars (Wingfield, 2007). The shares of
both the companies increased on the new development. These additional, outstanding
applications of downloading images, music and videos with the help of touch screen
technology were now attainable to customers who became concerned, nevertheless of
expensive pricing. In response, AT&T and Apple in this situation agreed to meet the
concern of the customers, which was to allow customers who could not afford a high
quality phone to use these phones in a practical manner (See Model).
People should not view the Cingular/AT&T merger as a company who focuses
within its internal structure. People should look at the merger as a combination of two
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companies that desire to recover from financial woes and gain better reviews from the
customers. The wireless customers are the group most affected by the merger, such as
retaining their numbers, and avoiding the long-distance/roaming charges.

1.4 AT&T Inc.: An Ideal Merged Corporation
In addition to keeping good relations with their customers, the two companies
within the merger maintained a universal goal. The goal for Cingular Wireless LLC and
AT&T Wireless was one in which they agreed not to compete against each other to
determine the brand name or icon of the merger. Once they cooperated with each other,
these two companies had the ability to bring the consumers into buying their products.
The companies’ concerns had a resolution in such a manner that combined the two small
symbols into one strong, concrete symbol. For example, the merger proved this point
when it kept the AT&T name and traditional blue color, simultaneously utilizing
Cingular’s reliable services. This change and the compromise by the two companies were
very vital for becoming a successful corporation within the wireless market.
Financially, AT&T showed outstanding results in comparison to its competitors
(See Table 3). The only aspect company became successful was its financial strength
with a debt-to-equity ratio of 77.83429. Last year, AT&T had the highest stock return of
7.38920. AT&T’s net profit margin was 8.65798, while maintaining a slim lead over
Verizon. The table shows that although AT&T leads in the telecommunication industry, it
is in a close competition with Verizon.
When we look at the merger between Cingular Wireless LLC and AT&T
Wireless, we see positive changes within the combination. The merger sought to
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eliminate problems within its service and deliver customer satisfaction through a
combined effort. This is important because a merged organization should follow this
strategy. It should focus on the customer demand so that they can benefit as a business,
gain customer trust, and expand their services to other prospective wireless customers.
Simultaneously, the merger should also focus on the fair business practices for its
employees and the willingness to have the two companies cooperate to achieve this
success.
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Figure 1.1

Model of Product Capital and Performance of Acquisitions
Product Capital

Selection

Deployment

-Product Support (enabled

-People (wireless

-People (wireless

users to utilize I-Phone for

customers w/ low

customers w/ low

internet and telephone

income)

income)

capabilities)

-Product (Apple’s

-Product

-Product Development

I-Phone for

(525,000 Apple’s

(integration of touch screen

AT&T users)

I-Phones

Long-Term Financial Performance
-Using this product strategy, AT&T recovered
from past financial struggles and increased in
net profit.
-Analysts predict Apple consumers will
subscribe to AT&T service (Vault Online
Career Library, 2009)

technology to phone)

consumed)

This figure presents a model for product capital and performance of acquisitions.
In particular:
1) The hypothesis is introducing the I-Phone boosted overall financial performance of the
merger.
2) The outcome variable is AT&T’s long-term financial performance in that merger’s
profits measures by product and customer usage. In the model, customers bought 525,000
Apple I-Phones.
3) The model contains many predictor variables in the forms of product capital, selection,
and deployment. The variables are measure by customer demand, consumption, and
sales.
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2. Sprint Nextel

2.1 Wireless Companies Preceding the Merger
Sprint Corporation held many partnerships during the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike
AT&T, Sprint was not included in the Bell telephone system. The company was a
competitor to the Bell telephone system. Prior to the merger, Sprint collaborated with
RadioShack stores to house their phone products and merged with MCI WorldCom.
Nextel was a smaller company that introduced a new aspect to the cellular phone product.
It implemented the “push to talk“system in their “Direct Connect” utility. Both
companies individually provided no competition to the booming Verizon or AT&T.

A. History of Sprint Corporation
Cleyson Leroy Brown and Carlos Florendo Jr. founded the Brown Telephone
Company in Albeine, Kansas in 1898. The company changed into several names, such as
United Utilities and Telecom, during its run toward the mid 20th Century. In 1978,
Southern Pacific Communications Company (SPCC) created a long distance division that
utilized Private Line connections. SPCC used the Sprint service, which was only
available to six urban cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San
Diego, and Anaheim. Los Angeles and New York were the cities that maintained the
switches to the service Thus, the user needed to pay and have the Private Line
connections to any of these two switches to use the Sprint Service.
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In 1989, United Telecom purchased interest of US Sprint, after it had merged with
GTE Telenet and US Telecom, from SPCC. Two years later, United Telecom acquired
US Sprint and eventually renamed itself Sprint due to the rising demand for the Sprint
Service. In 1992, Sprint corporate executives believed that its upcoming deal with
Chicago-based Centel Corporation would increase the number of subscribers for this
merger (Ramirez, 1992). In the Spring of 1993, Sprint completed its merger with Centel.
At the time, Sprint was the only telecommunications company in the United States that
included cellular, local, and long distance services (Pendleton, 1993). Sprint went on to
create joint ventures with overseas telecommunications companies, such as R.P. Telekom
S.A., a Polish independent telephone network (New York Times, 1994).
By the late 1990s, Sprint created a wireless service known as Sprint PCS, which
made a major breakthrough for the company. In 1998, Sprint PCS bought stocks from
cable television partners such as Comcast, and Cox Communications. Analysts believed
the initial public offering (IPO) of Sprint rose between $500 million and $1 billion
(Phillips Business, 1998). Sprint PCS brought more capital to the company in the same
year.

B. History of Nextel Communications
In

1987,

telecommunication

lawyer

Morgan

O’Brien

founded

a

telecommunication firm known as Fleet Call in Reston, Virginia. It was a direct
competitor of American Mobile Systems. Fleet Call held an advantage over AMS. Fleet
Call had 40,000 subscribers in New York, which was double the amount AMS had in five
years, and the same amount in Los Angeles, where AMS had no services (Crouch, 1988).
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Before Christmas of 1992, Fleet Call successfully acquired Dispatch Communications
Inc. in a $268 million transaction (Naik, 1992). In March 1993, there were several
changes for the Fleet Call Company. It created a digital wireless communications service
named Nextel, and renamed the company Nextel to reflect the success of this service
(Wall Street Journal, 1993).
Nextel gained a lot of popularity during the late 1990s. In November 1997, the
company discontinued charging roaming fees, and developed the walkie-talkie cell
phones for kids and adults (Mehta, 1997). Nextel walkie-talkies were different from the
traditional cell phones other companies used. The walkies served as two-way radios
allowing each user to speak one at a time. It has better reception than public phones and
cheaper than the ordinary cell phone. Nextel stated that these radio frequencies would
expand across all urban areas in the nation to accommodate for their growth in
subscribers (Van, 1997). In March 1998, Nextel took a step further internationally. The
company purchased a 21% stake in J-Com Co from Nippon Motorola, Japanese
subsidiary of Motorola (New York Times, 1998). Both Sprint and Nextel had carried
their successes from the late 1990s into the early 2000s. After witnessing the successful
merger between AT&T and Cingular in 2004, both companies decided it was time for
them to start negotiating a deal.

2.2 The 2005 Merger

A. Another Blockbuster Merger
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Critics were right when they said that 2004 was going to be a big year for these
wireless companies. In December 11, 2004, both Sprint and Nextel negotiated a possible
deal of merging after both companies rose in the stock market after the former rejected
Verizon Wireless offer to merge (Meyerson, 2004). Many felt that the merger between
the number 3 and number 5 ranked companies has the possibility to surpass
AT&T/Cingular Wireless and Verizon Wireless. Five days later, the critics’ expectations
came true when Sprint CEO Gary Forsee and Nextel CEO Timothy Donahue announced
a $35 billion merger (Alexander, 2004). Both companies claimed that the changes to the
service would not occur immediately. The companies stated that the merger would
remain as one company with two available wireless networks for customers.
During the holiday season of 2004, critics positively predicted that Sprint Nextel
would stay number three directly behind Verizon with 39 million wireless customers
(Montalbano, 2004). In August 15, 2005, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) approved of the Sprint and Nextel merger (Transport Topics, 2005). The FCC also
announced the new company simply named as Sprint Nextel Corporation. One immediate
sign of the growth potential was during the end of August when they bought affiliates,
Gulf Coast Wireless and IWO Holdings Inc (Los Angeles Times, 2005). Sprint Nextel
merger was unique in that both companies of the merger were not members of Bell
telephone system. These two companies developed through many decades to become
successful as they are today.

B. Company Management
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Although they were able to acquire affiliates after the Summer 2005 merger,
Sprint Nextel Corporation had a few internal matters to deal with. Sprint Nextel
Corporation tried to find ways on how to differentiate their services. The deal of each
company had a benefit. A Sprint customer has the option to have a $100, 2,000-minutesper-month rate plan, giving him or her, the ability to add free incoming calls. A Nextel
customer has the option to pay $10 extra per month to talk free evening hours starting at
six in the evening.
Initially, the merger completely ignored the Nextel portion prohibiting Nextel
customers from switching and using Sprint’s features. The reason for this technicality is
Sprint Nextel did not purchase Nextel partners, a separate entity that is responsible for
some of the Nextel brands. In late October, Nextel Partners exercised the option allowing
Sprint Nextel to buy the smaller wireless entity (Wall Street Journal, 2005). The company
began taking action into restructuring stores of both services to retain all customers.

2.3 Sprint Nextel: During and After the Merger

A. Combined Identity “Equals” Combined Icon
Unlike Cingular/AT&T, the Sprint Nextel merger began plans on creating an icon
shortly after the merger took place in 2005. As they announce in early 2005, the merger
simply referred to as Sprint Nextel Corporation. In the same manner, the symbol would
include icons from both companies. In September 2005, the Sprint name began to appear
in a “Nextel” font and bathed in “Nextel yellow” (Fershleiser, 2005). The stores carrying
both services would also include these changes. The merger made a correct decision in
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creating this icon because they wanted to include members and customers of both
services as being a part of the merger’s success.

B. Connecting the Phone with “The Tube”
In the Fall of 2005, Sprint Nextel made deals with several cable companies to
broadcast their programs using the Sprint PCS service. The firm collaborated with Time
Warner Cable, Comcast, and Cox Communications to provide the wireless services for
fast speed Broadband services and television programming to Sprint Nextel subscribers.
Sprint Nextel Corporation felt that the cellular service along with this package overcomes
the regional Bell markets and expands into the television market (New York Times,
2005). Sprint Nextel Corporation makes a breakthrough by expanding from the
telecommunications industry into the entertainment industry.

C. Sprint Nextel’s Touchdown
Besides the entertainment industry, Sprint Nextel Corporation became involved
with the sports industry soon after its merger in Summer 2005. Sprint Nextel signed a
five-year deal with the National Football League (NFL) allowing it to broadcast NFL
games, highlights, and all NFL content (Wall Street Journal, 2005). The company paid
$200 million to the league directly and an additional $100 million for advertisements and
sponsorships to the NFL Network and NFL.com.
In 2006, NFL fans were impressed by Sprint Nextel’s live stream of the 2006
NFL Draft showing the NFL executives and top prospects for the draft. Steve Gaffney,
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director of sports marketing, stated that the NFL fans would be a crucial part of the
wireless company’s success (Hiestand, 2006). In addition, these same fans would be able
to create their own fantasy teams using the features of their Sprint Nextel phones. The
2006 NFL Draft sparked a $3 billion to $4 billon boost to both the sports industry and
wireless industry (McCarthy, 2006). Sprint Nextel made a bold and successful move in
that they captured a sport in which people of all ages watch.

D. Sprint Nextel’s Financial Failures
During the initial stages of today’s current economic recession, Sprint Nextel
Corporation faced many predicaments internally and externally. In January 2008, the
company’s stock price fell $2.87 to $8.70, at least 25% per share, marking it the stock’s
largest price drop since July 1980 (Los Angeles Times, 2008). The cause of this was the
intense competition from Verizon Wireless and AT&T. Sprint Nextel lost many
customers from November 2007 to January 2008. These customers were people
fascinated by the VCast service and offers with Verizon Wireless, and by the Apple IPhone service officially partnered with AT&T.
These external problems spread to the company’s internally. Sprint Nextel
Corporations had to deal with their outlet stores and their employees. Sprint CEO Gary
Forsee left in October 2007 and accused Nextel for weakening the merger while the
merged company’s board blamed him for financial crisis (Sharma and Lublin, 2007). In
January 2008, Sprint Nextel announced it would cut 7 percent of the company’s
workforce and close 125 retail stores to ensure is survival in this economic downturn
(Goldfarb, 2008). The closing of the stores caused average sales of phones to drop. The
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only situation where Sprint Nextel recovered from the drop was when it owned 49
percent of Virgin Mobile (USA) (Vault Online Career Library, 2009). The only option
the Sprint Nextel employees had was to leave the organization or to operate in a more
remote location.
2.4 Sprint Nextel Corporation: A Well Matched Combination
Sprint Nextel Corporation had a good start during the initial stages of the merger
in Summer 2005. As they progressed through the year, they had problems in maintaining
a specific goal. Both Sprint and Nextel almost competed against each other in the merger
when they debated which service was more promising to the merger’s overall customers.
During Summer 2005, the board of each company had to devise this option of allowing
customers of each service to switch to the other service’s plan as opposed to planning
about this option after the merger took place. The goal of the Sprint Nextel Corporation is
consistency. Both companies within the merger are supposed to be equals. Therefore,
they operate as equals. For instance, the merger could allow Nextel users the option of
adding the NFL package in their cell phones. In the same manner, the merger could
develop more walkie-talkies for Sprint users. Another goal is find partners, such as
Microsoft, to develop products for Sprint Nextel similar to how AT&T collaborated with
Apple to create the I-Phone for AT&T.
Financially, Sprint Nextel showed dismal results in comparison to its competitors
(See Table 3). The only aspect company became successful was its financial strength
with a debt-to-equity ratio of 124.56720. Last year, Sprint Nextel had a stock return of
-41.51960, which was 48.9088 lower than AT&T’s stock return. Sprint Nextel’s net
profit margin was -33.07065, which was 41.72863 lower than AT&T’s net profit margin.
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The table shows that Sprint Nextel fails in the telecommunication industry because of its
losses exceeding its gains.

Figure 2.1

Model of Product Capital and Performance of Acquisitions
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users)

This figure presents a model for product capital and performance of acquisitions.
In particular:
1) The hypothesis is introducing the NFL package to Sprint Nextel phones boosted
overall financial performance of the merger.
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2) The outcome variable is Sprint Nextel’s long-term financial performance in that
merger’s profits measures by product and customer usage. The walkie-talkie phones with
the enhanced NFL feature gave a $4 billion revenue to the NFL
3) The model contains many predictor variables in the forms of product capital, selection,
and deployment. The variables are measure by customer demand, consumption, and
sales.

3. Verizon

3.1 Wireless Companies Preceding the Merger
Both Verizon Wireless and Alltel Wireless were top selling wireless carriers
during the 2000s along with AT&T and Sprint Nextel. Verizon Communications was one
of the seven Baby Bells operating in the Atlantic Region from the 1980s to the 2000s.
Alltel Corporation’s creation occurred in the 1940s after which other independent
companies merged with it. Prior to the 2008 merger, Verizon’s service, Verizon Wireless,
was runner up to AT&T after AT&T merged with Cingular to take the wireless carrier
crown from Verizon, and Alltel was fifth largest carrier in the nation.

A. History of Verizon Wireless Communications
Verizon Communications, Inc. began as Bell Atlantic Corporation (NYSE: BEL)
and NYNEX Corporation. Bell Atlantic Corporation, formed in 1983, was one of the
seven “Baby Bells” within the Bell telephone system. Bell Atlantic Corporation included
regional telephone companies such as Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, New
Jersey Bell Telephone Company, Diamond State Telephone Company, Chesapeake
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Potomac Telephone Company, Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland,
Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia, and Chesapeake Potomac
Telephone Company of West Virginia. In 1994, the names simply referred to as Bell
Atlantic- Name of State. For example, the names for some of these companies were Bell
Atlantic-Pennsylvania, and Bell Atlantic- Maryland. NYNEX Corporation was a regional
Bell company formed in 1984 by subsidiaries New York Telephone Company and New
England Telephone. NYNEX had a few noticeable troubles in the 1990s. An example
was the infamous violation of the Bell System breakup decree in February 1993. Before
filing $1 million fine, NYNEX appealed in court on the grounds that it informed the
Justice Department about purchasing Telco Research. NYNEX executives claimed they
moved computer used by MCI Communications and transfer ownership to them
(Carnevale, 1993).
In April 1996, Bell Atlantic Corporation and NYNEX Corporation initially agreed
to merge. The FCC approved the $25.6 billion merger in August 17, 1997 referring the
merger as the “New Bell Atlantic” (Electronic News, 1997). Bell Atlantic merger was
one of the largest combinations in the wireless industry during the late 1990s. Bell
Atlantic accessed about 40 millions telephone lines and 5.5 million customers in more
than 19 states. Bell Atlantic thrived during this period providing both well received local
and cellular phone reviews.
In July 2000, Bell Atlantic underwent a significant change. Pace University
Graduate and Bell Atlantic CEO, Ivan Seidenberg, felt the need for Bell Atlantic to
expand into more states in the Atlantic such as Maine and Vermont (Howe, 2000).
Seidenberg’s wish became true when the FCC approved $59 billion merger between Bell
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Atlantic and GTE Corporation (Nathan, 2000). The merged company was no longer Bell
Atlantic. The name of the merger was Verizon Communications, Inc. This giant merger
deal provided telephone service to 95 million homes in 30 states and brought 25 million
customers. Verizon Communications and Vodafone Group PLC created a joint venture
known as Verizon Wireless. Urban areas were the markets where Verizon gained its
customers. Throughout the 2000s, Verizon Wireless ranked number 1 in wireless carrier
ahead of competitor Cingular Wireless until its recent merger with AT&T, and became
well known for its outstanding Verizon Online DSL competing with Time Warner Cable.

B. History of Alltel Corporation
In 1943, Charles Miller and Hugh Willbourn, Jr. founded the Allied Telephone
Company, an independent telephone company in Arkansas mainly responsible for
installing telephone cables and poles throughout the state. In 1983, Mid-Continent
Telephone, founded by Weldon and Nelson Case, merged with Allied to create Alltel
Corporation. Alltel had many successes during the mid to late 1980s. In 1985, it created
its first wireless service. In 1989, Alltel had two instances of acquisitions. In January 3,
1989, Alltel acquired CP National Corp., A San Francisco telecommunications and gas
utility holding company. During the acquisition, Alltel exchanged 1.15 of common stock
for approximately 7,550,000 outstanding shares of CP National Corp. (Wall Street
Journal, 1989). In March 1989, Alltel acquired HWC Distribution Corp, a Houston
distributor of electrical cables and wire. This acquisition involved Alltel acquiring HWC
Distribution for $26.05 per share, at about $143 million (Wall Street Journal, 1989).
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In March 1990, Alltel made a huge leap. The company acquired Systematics Inc.,
software maker, about 16 million shares at a market value of $528 million. Systematics
Inc., well known for its advanced software for banks and other financial institutions,
proved to help Alltel expand while operating independently (Wall Street Journal, 1990).
Throughout the 1990s, Alltel acquired many small regional telephone companies.
Throughout the early to mid 2000s, the company acquired regional telephone services of
companies such as Verizon and Cingular. However, Alltel was a failed telephone
company because it was only accessible to rural areas. In 2008, Alltel made itself known
when it made its largest deal when agreeing to an acquisition by Verizon for $27 billion.

3.2 The 2008 Merger

A. A Mega Merger for Wireless Crown
In June 2008, Verizon Communications and Alltel were behind AT&T in nation’s
top carrier, which gained an abundance of subscribers due to the popularity of the IPhone. Reports showed AT&T had at least 71.4 subscribers in the first quarter of 2008
(Sharma, Berman, Ng, 2008). Verizon developed a deal in which it could potentially
surmount AT&T’s number of customers. The number two wireless carrier talked with
Alltel, the number five wireless carrier, about a possible $27 million merger that creates
about 80 millions subscribers for the merged company. Although it was behind AT&T
prior to the merger, Verizon’s service, Verizon Wireless, was ahead of Sprint Nextel.
Some sources state that Verizon gained and will snatch customers from Sprint Nextel,
who had their problems of retaining customers (Sharma, Berman, Ng, 2008).
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During the merger, Verizon invested on other services. One of the services
includes buying 700-megahertz licenses that TV operators formerly owned, for about $10
million (Cauley, 2008). Alltel explained one of the benefits of its merger with Verizon is
the fact that both companies share the same technology for their cell phones known as
CDMA. The company also stated that with its assistance, the merger enables Verizon to
expand into certain rural regions that it never provided service. Analysts believed the
Verizon/Alltel merger bring benefits to the rural areas by providing the next generation
fast-speed internet connection, known in those areas as Long Term Evolution. This
internet connection claimed to bring nearly perfected streamed videos to cell phones and
wireless videoconferencing on laptops. On November 5, 2008, the FCC approved the
Verizon acquisition of Alltel. The newly formed company simply referred to as Verizon
Wireless gained approximately 105 markets, where the wireless company coincides with
Alltel (Los Angeles Times, 2008).
As predicted, Verizon’s acquisition of Alltel made it number one wireless carrier
in the United States surpassing AT&T. Strong advertising on its smartphones, such as the
Blackberry Storm, currently stands at more than $10 billion (Ward, 2009). Verizon made
a superb strategic move. By acquiring Alltel, Verizon highlights their fast wireless
services to rural residents.

B. Company Management
Although 2009 is the first full year of the Verizon/Alltel merger, the merger
discloses a few amount of information regarding company management. Analysts predict
of a future conversion of Alltel services converted into Verizon services and products
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similar to the case of 2004’s AT&T and Cingular merger. Advertising will also reveal
that Verizon is indeed the parent company of Alltel. Another positive is that there are
currently no arguments between the companies as opposed to Sprint and Nextel merger
conflict, indicating that Alltel agreed to collaborate with Verizon to establish a sound
strategy.

3.3 Verizon: During and After the Merger
As predicted, Verizon has become the nation’s largest telecommunications
company due to gaining Alltel’s customers. Unlike AT&T and Sprint Nextel, there is
little change within Verizon Wireless. Alltel simply becomes Verizon, who receives the
benefits of additional customers. Alltel collect benefits of Verizon Wireless’ Open
Development initiative, which allows all third parties to use the Verizon Wireless
network (Network Business Weekly, 2008). Many customers of both companies view the
merger as a success because each provider offer two similar wireless networks into a
large integrated network.

3.4 Verizon Wireless: A Flourishing Merger
Although AT&T holds the contract with Apple and the I-Phone product, Verizon
wins the battle with customers. Since it released the I-Phone in 2007, AT&T gained
customers who were mostly responsive for the product as opposed to the wireless service
and eventually became number one service provider. In the second quarter of 2008, both
Verizon and AT&T dropped below 2 million subscribers, approximately the quantity of
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subscribers of each company in the fourth quarter of 2007. After making the deal with
Alltel, Verizon has a customer database it had never imagined of attracting before.
Verizon’s Blackberry Storm may not be as attractive as the I-Phone, but it is more formal
(Pittsburgh Post, 2009). Verizon will improve the Blackberry Storm and its existing
products to make progress in the near future.
Financially, Verizon grew steadily in comparison to its competitors (See Table 3).
The company showed signs of financial strength with a debt-to-equity ratio of 124.56720.
Last year, Verizon had a stock return of 2.60630, which was 4.7829 lower than AT&T’s
stock return. Verizon’s net profit margin was 7.41794, which was 1.24004 lower than
AT&T’s net profit margin. The table shows that Verizon is in close competition with
AT&T with its financials.
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Figure 3.1

Model of Product Capital and Performance of Acquisitions
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This figure presents a model for product capital and performance of acquisitions.
In particular:
1) The hypothesis is introducing the Blackberry Storm boosted overall financial
performance of the merger.
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2) The outcome variable is Verizon’s long-term financial performance in that merger’s
profits measures by product and customer usage. Consumer totals of Blackberry Storms
were about 226 phones.
3) The model contains many predictor variables in the forms of product capital, selection,
and deployment. The variables are measure by customer demand, consumption, and
sales.

Table 1: Pre-Merger Analysis of the Firms
The table profiles strengths and weaknesses of the Wireless companies involved in the merger.

Wireless Companies
i) AT&T

Strengths

Weaknesses

- Became popular service
provider during the rise of cell
phones in the 1990s
- Gained customers from its no
roaming and long distance fee
policies

- Its lack of integrating
technology caused Cingular and
Verizon to surpass it in early
2000s
- It was unable to capture the
urban markets

- First users of GSM technology
- Acquired AT&T in 2004 for
$41 billion to create a company
with 46 million customers
- Purchased stocks from Comcast
to increase revenue
- Sprint PCS became a main
factor for the company’s
successful stock purchases

- Sprint rejected their offer to
merge in 2002

- Battled with financial data
during the late 1990s
- Losses during this period
exceeded investor expectations

v) Verizon

- Became popular because of the
walkie-talkie phones
- Followed AT&T’s strategy of
no roaming and long distance fee
policies
- Commonly used service
provider in urban and rural
markets
- Became well-known for mobile
provider in various businesses
- Added about 500,000 new long
distance consumers in April 2001

vi) Alltel

- Created partnerships within
companies in other industries,

- Only accessible to rural areas

ii) Cingular

iii) Sprint

iv) Nextel
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- Sprint PCS caused disagreement
within company’s partners
- Has less customers than AT&T
during the late 1990s

- Struggled with price
competition with its competitors

such as fuel and banking

Table 2: Post-Merger Analysis of the Firms
The table profiles strategic moves and missteps of the Wireless companies involved in the merger.

Wireless Companies

Strategic/Synergistic
Moves

Missteps

i) AT&T/Cingular

- Surpassed Verizon from 20042008 as number one wireless
carrier
- Upgraded 3G network to phones
to attract customers
- Acquired BellSouth for $67
billion
- Gained profits from sales of
Apple I-Phone from AT&T and
Apple consumers(Vault Online
Career Library, 2009)
- Attracted NFL fans using the
NFL fantasy league feature
- Allowed members of both
services to stay or switch to the
other service provider

- Established an identity several
months after 2004 merger

ii) Sprint/Nextel

iii) Verizon/Alltel

- Recently surpassed AT&T as
number one carrier with a larger
customer database with 80
billion customers
- Continued to improve wireless
and broadband services for all
brands of phones
- Created Long Term Evolution
bringing fast-speed internet
connection to rural areas
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- Conflict within company
executives
- Sprint CEO Gary Forsee left
due to company’s blame of
contributing to financial crisis
- Cut 7% of workforce
- Closed several stores causing
phone sales to drop

Table 3: Ratio Analysis and Comparisons
This table presents financial performance as of 2008of the three companies resulting from their respective
mergers. The debt-to-equity ratio is in percentage, sales and earnings per share (EPS) are in U.S. dollars.
Stock returns, gross margin and net profit margin are in percentages.

Financial Metrics/Ratios

AT&T-Cingular

Sprint-Nextel

Verizon-Alltel

Current ratio

0.5333

1.1513

1.0065

Quick ratio

0.5333

1.0666

0.9257

Debt-to-equity

77.8343

106.9994

124.5672

Sales, last 1 year

4.2883

-9.0458

4.1564

Sales, last 5 years

25.0884

8.5162

7.6096

EPS, last 1 year

11.3986

-23859.3100

18.7983

EPS, last 5 years

4.1454

-99999.9900

12.5162

Stock returns, last 1 year

7.3892

-41.5196

2.6063

Stock returns, last 5 years

1.6400

0.0000

1.8400

Gross margin

55.1940

54.4936

53.9328

Net profit margin

8.6579

-33.0706

7.4179

A. Financial Strength

B. Growth Measures (avg.)

C. Profitability and Margins
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Conclusion

In evaluating the mergers, the company that is the best and ideal merger in the
wireless industry is number two-ranked AT&T Inc. Although AT&T performed well in
most of its financial areas such as, highest gross margin and net profit margin, it had
some weaknesses. As seen on the financials on Table 3, AT&T assumed less debt and
lacked liquidity with its low current ratio compared to its competitors. AT&T’s relatively
low quick ratio shows its inability to pay off debts. AT&T’s financial success was mainly
from its ability to integrate its efforts to merge with its joint venture, Cingular Wireless,
to create a large telecommunications company. The newly formed company was able to
collaborate with another successful technology company, Apple. While partnering with
Apple, both companies created the most innovative and well-marketed product in this
decade, the Apple I-Phone exclusively for AT&T. Verizon Wireless is number one in the
wireless industry and already overcome AT&T with its strategy of attracting customers.
Although Verizon was below AT&T in terms of gross margin and net profit margin, it
faired better than its competitor did in its liquidity and ability to pay debts. In terms of
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product sales, it needs to perfect its work on touchscreen technology phones so that it will
overcome the profitability of the I-Phone. Sprint Nextel, number three-ranked provider,
has a tougher time to become number one. It had dismal financial results in almost all
ratios. Unless the company resolves its internal and customer problems, it may have close
competition with the other two companies. The walkie phones are innovative, but they
cannot attract customers for the company if Sprint Nextel poorly markets the products. A
successful merger involves both innovation and strategic planning.
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